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直播平台打赏收人分成模式研究
期刊论文
系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 卷号: 40, 期号: 5, 页码: 1221-1228
作者:
郑森圭
;
苏丹华
;
汪寿阳
;
尚维
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  |  
浏览/下载:31/0
  |  
提交时间:2021/01/14
live streaming platforms
reward income
sharing model
principal-agent model
incentive mechanism
直播平台
打赏收入
分成模式
委托代理模型
激励机制
The incentive mechanism of knowledge sharing in the industrial construction supply chain based on a supervisory mechanism
期刊论文
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 2019, 卷号: 26, 期号: 6, 页码: 989-1003
作者:
Wang, Qiankun
;
Shi, Qiao*
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  |  
浏览/下载:4/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Construction
Engineering
Incentive model
Industrial construction supply chain
Knowledge management
Knowledge sharing
Novel model
Principal–agent theory
Supply chain
Supply chain management
The Study of the Two-Way Principal–Agent Model Based on Asymmetric Information
期刊论文
Wireless Personal Communications, 2018, 卷号: 102, 期号: 2, 页码: 629-639
作者:
Dai, Siguang*
;
Nie, Guihua
;
Xiao, Nian
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  |  
浏览/下载:7/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Asymmetric information
Lagrange multipliers
Two-way principal–agent model
Utility function
Virtual principal
Research on government supervision and enterprise water pollution control based on the principal-agent model
期刊论文
Desalination and Water Treatment, 2018, 卷号: 121, 页码: 213-218
作者:
Dai, Siguang*
;
Nie, Guihua
;
Wu, Zhong
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  |  
浏览/下载:5/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Water pollution control
Government supervision
Asymmetric information
Principal-agent model
Understanding the Incentive Mechanism of Penalty for Information Security Policy Compliance Behavior
会议论文
2018 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SCIENCE, EDUCATION AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH (SSEHR 2018), 2018-01-01
作者:
Wang, Xiaolong
;
Li, Wenli
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  |  
浏览/下载:2/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/02
Incentive mechanism
Information security policy
Compliance behavior
Principal-agent model with moral hazard
Penalty
A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
期刊论文
COMPUTATIONAL & APPLIED MATHEMATICS, 2018, 卷号: 37, 页码: 541-566
作者:
Zhu, Zhichuan
;
Yu, Bo
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  |  
浏览/下载:6/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/02
Principal-agent model
Piecewise linear contractual function
Homotopy method
Nonconvex programming
Simpson's rule
Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
期刊论文
OPTIMIZATION METHODS & SOFTWARE, 2017, 卷号: 32, 页码: 69-85
作者:
Zhu, Zhichuan
;
Yu, Bo
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  |  
浏览/下载:7/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/02
principal-agent model
homotopy algorithm
bilevel programming
non-convex programming
Explicit Incentive Mechanism of the Agent Construction System for Government Investment Projects: A Model Study Based on Asymmetric Information
会议论文
6th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (IEMI), Tianjin Univ, Tianjin, PEOPLES R CHINA, 2016-01-01
作者:
Dai, Da-shuang
;
Zhang, Shuang
;
Liu, Zi-xin
;
Feng, Chao
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  |  
浏览/下载:7/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/09
Agent construction system
Explicit incentives
Information asymmetry
Principal agent model
Corporate governance, executive compensation incentives and corporate performance — Analysis of improved principal-agent innovation model
期刊论文
International Journal of Simulation: Systems, Science and Technology, 2016, 卷号: 17, 期号: 28, 页码: 35.1-35.7
作者:
Li, Shanshan
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  |  
浏览/下载:12/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/16
Corporate governance
Corporate performance
Executive compensation incentive
Principal-agent model
Incentives Research for Enterprises to Participate in VEP in the Multitask Principal-Agent Model
期刊论文
SHS Web of Conferences, 2015, 卷号: Vol.14
作者:
Sha Mo and Xiaoping Shi
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  |  
浏览/下载:1/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/31
Voluntary Environmental Program
enterprise
Multitask Principal-Agent Model
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