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Agent's Optimal Compensation Under Inflation Risk by Using Dynamic Contract Model
期刊论文
JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE & COMPLEXITY, 2021, 卷号: 34, 期号: 6, 页码: 2291-2309
作者:
Fei Chen
;
Fei Weiyin
;
Zhang Fanhong
;
Yang Xiaoguang
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:13/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/04/02
Equity incentive
inflation risk
Ito formula
principal-agent problem
the martingale representation theorem
Benefit distribution of collectively-owned operating construction land entering the market in rural China: A multiple principal-agent theory-based analysis
期刊论文
HABITAT INTERNATIONAL, 2021, 卷号: 109, 页码: 15
作者:
Yan, Lei
;
Hong, Kairong
;
Chen, Kunqiu
;
Li, Hui
;
Liao, Liuwen
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  |  
浏览/下载:22/0
  |  
提交时间:2021/06/10
Land institution reform
Urban-rural transformation development
Rural vitalization
Land-use efficiency
Principal identity of farmers
Multiple principal-agent theory
More Stringent Cap or Higher Penalty Fee? Dealing with Procrastination in Environmental Protection
期刊论文
ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2020, 卷号: 21, 期号: 1, 页码: 41-69
作者:
Guo, Dongmei
;
Wang, Shouyang
;
Zhao, Lin
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  |  
浏览/下载:24/0
  |  
提交时间:2020/06/30
Environmental policy
Time-inconsistent preferences
Present bias
Procrastination
Cap-and-trade
Principal-agent
直播平台打赏收人分成模式研究
期刊论文
系统工程理论与实践, 2020, 卷号: 40, 期号: 5, 页码: 1221-1228
作者:
郑森圭
;
苏丹华
;
汪寿阳
;
尚维
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  |  
浏览/下载:31/0
  |  
提交时间:2021/01/14
live streaming platforms
reward income
sharing model
principal-agent model
incentive mechanism
直播平台
打赏收入
分成模式
委托代理模型
激励机制
The incentive mechanism of knowledge sharing in the industrial construction supply chain based on a supervisory mechanism
期刊论文
Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 2019, 卷号: 26, 期号: 6, 页码: 989-1003
作者:
Wang, Qiankun
;
Shi, Qiao*
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  |  
浏览/下载:4/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Construction
Engineering
Incentive model
Industrial construction supply chain
Knowledge management
Knowledge sharing
Novel model
Principal–agent theory
Supply chain
Supply chain management
An ontology-based approach for supply-chain quality control: From a principal-agent perspective
期刊论文
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SCIENCE, 2019, 卷号: 45, 页码: 283-303
作者:
Wang, Shanshan
;
Chen, Kun
;
Liu, Zhiyong
;
Guo, Ren-Yong
;
Chen, Si
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  |  
浏览/下载:12/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/02
Data-centric framework
ontologies
principal-agent contract
quality control
supply chain
Principal-agent problem for returns handling in a reverse supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing dealers
期刊论文
APPLIED MATHEMATICAL MODELLING, 2019, 卷号: 66, 页码: 118-140
作者:
Sun, Duo-qing
;
Ma, Xiao-ying
;
Wang, Da-jiang
;
Li, Jiao-jiao
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  |  
浏览/下载:8/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/30
Supply chain management
Returns handling
Principal-agent problem
Incentive contract
Fairness
Fixed-point theorem
An ontology-based approach for supply-chain quality control: From a principal-agent perspective
期刊论文
JOURNAL OF INFORMATION SCIENCE, 2019, 卷号: 45, 页码: 283-303
作者:
Wang, Shanshan
;
Chen, Kun
;
Liu, Zhiyong
;
Guo, Ren-Yong
;
Chen, Si
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:6/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/30
Data-centric framework
ontologies
principal-agent contract
quality control
supply chain
The Study of the Two-Way Principal–Agent Model Based on Asymmetric Information
期刊论文
Wireless Personal Communications, 2018, 卷号: 102, 期号: 2, 页码: 629-639
作者:
Dai, Siguang*
;
Nie, Guihua
;
Xiao, Nian
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:7/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Asymmetric information
Lagrange multipliers
Two-way principal–agent model
Utility function
Virtual principal
Research on government supervision and enterprise water pollution control based on the principal-agent model
期刊论文
Desalination and Water Treatment, 2018, 卷号: 121, 页码: 213-218
作者:
Dai, Siguang*
;
Nie, Guihua
;
Wu, Zhong
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  |  
浏览/下载:5/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Water pollution control
Government supervision
Asymmetric information
Principal-agent model
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