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兰州理工大学 [3]
浙江工商大学 [2]
厦门大学 [1]
重庆大学 [1]
自动化研究所 [1]
山东大学 [1]
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期刊论文 [7]
会议论文 [4]
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2022 [2]
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2015 [1]
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2010 [2]
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An Integrated Data Envelopment Analysis and Non-Cooperative Game Approach for Public Transportation Incentive Subsidy Allocation
期刊论文
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, 2022, 页码: 16
作者:
Xie, Qiwei
;
Wu, Xiao
;
Dai, Qianzhi
;
Zheng, Xiaolong
;
Wang, Fei-Yue
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:36/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/09/19
Resource management
Costs
Government
Games
Industries
Behavioral sciences
Data envelopment analysis
Subsidy allocation
data envelopment analysis
information asymmetry
Nash non-cooperative game
An evolutionary game of carbon subsidy policy considering consumption field
期刊论文
Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science, 2022, 卷号: 42, 期号: 3, 页码: 1456-1465
作者:
Wei, Qi
;
Ding, Ya-Nan
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  |  
浏览/下载:17/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/04/21
Carbon
Consumer behavior
Carbon production
Carbon trading
Consumption reductions
Evolutionary games
Generalized carbon trading
Government subsidies
Low carbon
Low carbon production
Low-carbon consumption
Tripartite evolutionary game
Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market
期刊论文
Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science, 2020, 卷号: 40, 期号: 2, 页码: 919-928
作者:
Wei, Qi
;
Li, Lin-Jing
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:10/0
  |  
提交时间:2022/02/17
Carbon
Dynamics
Profitability
Carbon emission trading
Dynamic game
Graded and progressive
Penalty coefficient
Power generation enterprise
Power generation industries
Punishment mechanism
Supervision systems
Research on graded and progressive punishment mechanism for power generation enterprises in carbon market
期刊论文
Zhongguo Huanjing Kexue/China Environmental Science, 2020, 卷号: 40, 期号: 2, 页码: 919-928
作者:
Wei, Qi
;
Li, Lin-Jing
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:8/0
  |  
提交时间:2020/11/14
Carbon
Dynamics
Profitability
Carbon emission trading
Dynamic game
Graded and progressive
Penalty coefficient
Power generation enterprise
Power generation industries
Punishment mechanism
Supervision systems
The Evolutionary Game of Electronic Seal Usage Behaviour Supervision From the Perspective of Credit and Penalty
期刊论文
IEEE ACCESS, 2018, 卷号: 6, 页码: 57751-57762
作者:
Liang, Hejun
;
Yuan, Guanghui
;
Yang, Yunpeng
;
Yang, Jianzheng
;
Fan, Chongjun
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  |  
浏览/下载:6/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/08/22
Electronic seal
corporate behaviour
government regulation
evolutionary game
credit rating
Grey Dynamic Game between the Government and Auto Enterprises for Energy Saving and Emission Reduction
期刊论文
2015, 卷号: 27, 页码: 74-91
作者:
Li, Sihuan[1,2]
;
Lv, Xianju[1]
;
Zhang, Weiguo[1,3]
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  |  
浏览/下载:1/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/11/28
煤炭企业安全投资保障机制的博弈分析
期刊论文
http://210.34.5.19/newcar/car_show.asp?ID=67, 2013
梁美健
;
吴慧香
;
杨光
收藏
  |  
浏览/下载:5/0
  |  
提交时间:2013/11/15
煤炭企业
安全投资
保障机制
博弈模型
coal enterprises
safety investment
guarantee system
game model
Research on Repeated Game Between Food Enterprises and Government Regulators
会议论文
7th International Conference on Innovation and Management, Wuhan Univ Technol, Wuhan, PEOPLES R CHINA, DEC 04-05, 2010
作者:
Shi Yaneng
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浏览/下载:1/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/04
Food enterprises
Government regulators
Repeated game
Discount rate
Pass rate
LAND PRICES AND HOUSING PRICES IN CHINA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY BASED ON THE GAME THEORY
会议论文
威海, 2010年1月1日
-
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  |  
浏览/下载:6/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/30
LAND PRICES
HOUSING PRICES
GAME BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISES
ADL MODEL
Study on the Two Cooperation Relationship between Governments and Enterprises in Cultivating Clusters Brands
会议论文
2nd Conference of the International-Institute-of-Applied-Statistics-Studies, JUL 24-29, 2009
作者:
Xiong Aihua
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  |  
浏览/下载:1/0
  |  
提交时间:2019/12/31
Clusters Brands
Government
Cooperation
Game
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