CORC  > 西安理工大学
CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory
Zhang, Chang-Zheng; Lv, Yue-Fan; Zhang, Gen-Lin
2017
卷号20页码:701-713
ISSN号09720502
URL标识查看原文
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/4976739
专题西安理工大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Zhang, Chang-Zheng,Lv, Yue-Fan,Zhang, Gen-Lin. CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory[J],2017,20:701-713.
APA Zhang, Chang-Zheng,Lv, Yue-Fan,&Zhang, Gen-Lin.(2017).CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory.,20,701-713.
MLA Zhang, Chang-Zheng,et al."CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory".20(2017):701-713.
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