CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory | |
Zhang, Chang-Zheng; Lv, Yue-Fan; Zhang, Gen-Lin | |
2017 | |
卷号 | 20页码:701-713 |
ISSN号 | 09720502 |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/4976739 |
专题 | 西安理工大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Zhang, Chang-Zheng,Lv, Yue-Fan,Zhang, Gen-Lin. CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory[J],2017,20:701-713. |
APA | Zhang, Chang-Zheng,Lv, Yue-Fan,&Zhang, Gen-Lin.(2017).CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory.,20,701-713. |
MLA | Zhang, Chang-Zheng,et al."CEO discretion, CEO tenure and executive pay-performance sensitivity: A dynamic model based on game theory".20(2017):701-713. |
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