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	Water management reform and the choice of contractual form in China
	Huang Q. Q. ; Rozelle S. ; Msangi S. ; Wang J. X. ; Huang J. K.
	2008
关键词	specification tests collective action local commons model preferences mexico
英文摘要	This paper explains the puzzling fact that in organizing the management of surface water, village leaders have provided incentives to canal managers in some areas, but not in all. Our study indicates that the optimal contractual choice depends on the relative abilities of the leader and the manager, the design of the cultivated land, the characteristics of the canal system and the opportunity costs of the leader and the pool of managerial candidates. The unifying mechanism is the relative change in the ability of the leader and manager to perform the unmarketable activities that are needed to provide irrigation services.
出处	Environment and Development Economics
卷	13
页	171-200
收录类别	SCI
语种	英语
ISSN号	1355-770X
内容类型	SCI/SSCI论文
源URL	[http://ir.igsnrr.ac.cn/handle/311030/23798]
专题	地理科学与资源研究所_历年回溯文献
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Huang Q. Q.,Rozelle S.,Msangi S.,et al. Water management reform and the choice of contractual form in China. 2008.

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