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A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model
Mao, Liang; Zhang, Tianyu
刊名ECONOMICS LETTERS
2017
卷号152
关键词Strategic bargaining Subgame perfect equilibrium Normalized procedures Minimal sufficient set
ISSN号0165-1765
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.006
URL标识查看原文
收录类别SSCI
语种英语
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/4108435
专题武汉大学
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Mao, Liang,Zhang, Tianyu. A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS,2017,152.
APA Mao, Liang,&Zhang, Tianyu.(2017).A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model.ECONOMICS LETTERS,152.
MLA Mao, Liang,et al."A minimal sufficient set of procedures in a bargaining model".ECONOMICS LETTERS 152(2017).
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