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	Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
	Quan, Ji*; Liu, Wei*; Chu, Yuqing; Wang, Xianjia
刊名	Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications
	2018
卷号	502页码:123-134
关键词	Optional public goods game Stochastic evolutionary game Stochastic stable equilibrium The evolution of cooperation
ISSN号	0378-4371
DOI	10.1016/j.physa.2018.02.101
URL标识	查看原文
WOS记录号	WOS:000432513200011;EI:20181004862947
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3370897
专题	武汉理工大学
作者单位	[Quan, Ji] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Hubei, Peoples R China.
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Quan, Ji*,Liu, Wei*,Chu, Yuqing,et al. Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations[J]. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,2018,502:123-134.
APA	Quan, Ji*,Liu, Wei*,Chu, Yuqing,&Wang, Xianjia.(2018).Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations.Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,502,123-134.
MLA	Quan, Ji*,et al."Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations".Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 502(2018):123-134.

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