链式多重委托-代理关系的激励——基于完全理性与过程性公平偏好模型的比较 The Incentive Mechanism of Chain-like Multiple Principal-Agent Model——A Comparative Study Based on Entirely Rational and Process Fairness Preference Model | |
赵宸元[1]; 蒲勇健[1]; 潘林伟[2] | |
2017 | |
卷号 | 0页码:121-131 |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3031956 |
专题 | 重庆大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 赵宸元[1],蒲勇健[1],潘林伟[2]. 链式多重委托-代理关系的激励——基于完全理性与过程性公平偏好模型的比较 The Incentive Mechanism of Chain-like Multiple Principal-Agent Model——A Comparative Study Based on Entirely Rational and Process Fairness Preference Model[J],2017,0:121-131. |
APA | 赵宸元[1],蒲勇健[1],&潘林伟[2].(2017).链式多重委托-代理关系的激励——基于完全理性与过程性公平偏好模型的比较 The Incentive Mechanism of Chain-like Multiple Principal-Agent Model——A Comparative Study Based on Entirely Rational and Process Fairness Preference Model.,0,121-131. |
MLA | 赵宸元[1],et al."链式多重委托-代理关系的激励——基于完全理性与过程性公平偏好模型的比较 The Incentive Mechanism of Chain-like Multiple Principal-Agent Model——A Comparative Study Based on Entirely Rational and Process Fairness Preference Model".0(2017):121-131. |
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