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	所有权集中下的企业控制权配置与非效率投资行为研究——兼论大股东的监督抑或合谋 Study on Allocation of Control Rights and Inefficient Investment Based on Ownership Concentration in Firms --Monitoring or Colluding among Multiple Large Shareholders？
	窦炜[1,2]; 刘星[1]
	2009
页码	107-117
URL标识	查看原文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3006054
专题	重庆大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	窦炜[1,2],刘星[1]. 所有权集中下的企业控制权配置与非效率投资行为研究——兼论大股东的监督抑或合谋 Study on Allocation of Control Rights and Inefficient Investment Based on Ownership Concentration in Firms --Monitoring or Colluding among Multiple Large Shareholders？[J],2009:107-117.
APA	窦炜[1,2],&刘星[1].(2009).所有权集中下的企业控制权配置与非效率投资行为研究——兼论大股东的监督抑或合谋 Study on Allocation of Control Rights and Inefficient Investment Based on Ownership Concentration in Firms --Monitoring or Colluding among Multiple Large Shareholders？.,107-117.
MLA	窦炜[1,2],et al."所有权集中下的企业控制权配置与非效率投资行为研究——兼论大股东的监督抑或合谋 Study on Allocation of Control Rights and Inefficient Investment Based on Ownership Concentration in Firms --Monitoring or Colluding among Multiple Large Shareholders？".(2009):107-117.

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