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Contract design on digital platform for the risk-averse retailer with moral hazard: Wholesale price vs two-part tariff
Li, Z.; Li, B.; Lan, Y.
刊名KYBERNETES
2018
卷号Vol.47 No.4页码:716-741
ISSN号0368-492X
URL标识查看原文
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2894397
专题天津大学
作者单位College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, China
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Li, Z.,Li, B.,Lan, Y.. Contract design on digital platform for the risk-averse retailer with moral hazard: Wholesale price vs two-part tariff[J]. KYBERNETES,2018,Vol.47 No.4:716-741.
APA Li, Z.,Li, B.,&Lan, Y..(2018).Contract design on digital platform for the risk-averse retailer with moral hazard: Wholesale price vs two-part tariff.KYBERNETES,Vol.47 No.4,716-741.
MLA Li, Z.,et al."Contract design on digital platform for the risk-averse retailer with moral hazard: Wholesale price vs two-part tariff".KYBERNETES Vol.47 No.4(2018):716-741.
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