Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations

doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.08.001

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	Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations
	Zhang, Jun
刊名	INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
	2013-09
卷号	31 期号:5 页码:452-461
关键词	Auctions Mechanism design Return policies Uncertain valuations
ISSN号	0167-7187
DOI	10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.08.001
英文摘要	This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations. This uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post-purchase cost. We focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a returned object (salvage value). We first study the case where the salvage value is exogenously determined. We find that the revenue maximizing mechanism is deterministic and "separable". We illustrate that the optimal revenue can be implemented by a mechanism with a "no-questions-asked" return policy. In addition, we show that "linear return policies" are suboptimal when the hazard rates of initial estimates are monotone. We next examine the case where the salvage value is endogenously determined. We demonstrate that "separability" no longer holds and the "recall" of buyers is necessary in the optimal mechanism. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
WOS记录号	WOS:000330000800009
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/2874]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Zhang, Jun
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang, Jun. Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,2013,31(5):452-461.
APA	Zhang, Jun.(2013).Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,31(5),452-461.
MLA	Zhang, Jun."Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations".INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 31.5(2013):452-461.