Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
	Han, Xiang 1,2
刊名	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
	2018-01
卷号	107 页码:1-20
关键词	Indivisible object Priority House allocation Housing market Stability Group strategy-proofness
ISSN号	0899-8256
DOI	10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.013
英文摘要	We study the indivisible object allocation problem without monetary transfer, in which each object is endowed with a weak priority ordering over agents. It is well known that stability is generally not compatible with efficiency. We characterize the priority structures for which a stable and efficient assignment always exists, as well as the priority structures that admit a stable, efficient and (group) strategy-proof rule. While house allocation problems and housing markets are two classic families of allocation problems that admit a stable, efficient and group strategy-proof rule, any priority-augmented allocation problem with more than three objects admits such a rule if and only if it is decomposable into a sequence of subproblems, each of which has the structure of a house allocation problem or a housing market. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000423655600001
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/2814]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Han, Xiang
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Minist Educ, Key Lab Math Econ SUFE, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Han, Xiang. Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,2018,107:1-20.
APA	Han, Xiang.(2018).Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities.GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,107,1-20.
MLA	Han, Xiang."Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities".GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 107(2018):1-20.