Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information
	Shneyerov, Artyom 1,2; Wong, Adam Chi Leung 3
刊名	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
	2010-03
卷号	68 期号:2 页码:748-762
关键词	Matching and bargaining Search frictions Two-sided incomplete information Diamond's paradox
ISSN号	0899-8256
DOI	10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.005
英文摘要	We study equilibria of a dynamic matching and bargaining game (DMBG) with two-sided private information bilateral bargaining. The model is a private information replica of Mortensen and Wright (2002). There are two kinds of frictions: time discounting and explicit search costs. A simple necessary and sufficient condition oil parameters for existence of a nontrivial equilibrium is obtained. This condition is the same regardless whether the information is private or not. In addition, it is shown that when the discount rate is Sufficiently small, the equilibrium is unique and has the property that every meeting results in trade. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000275524500022
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/2399]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Shneyerov, Artyom
作者单位	1.Concordia Univ, CIRANO, CIREQ, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada; 2.Concordia Univ, Dept Econ, Montreal, PQ H3G 1M8, Canada; 3.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Shneyerov, Artyom,Wong, Adam Chi Leung. Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,2010,68(2):748-762.
APA	Shneyerov, Artyom,&Wong, Adam Chi Leung.(2010).Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information.GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,68(2),748-762.
MLA	Shneyerov, Artyom,et al."Bilateral matching and bargaining with private information".GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 68.2(2010):748-762.