REPUTATION, TRUST, AND REBATES: HOW ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS CAN IMPROVE THEIR FEEDBACK MECHANISMS

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	REPUTATION, TRUST, AND REBATES: HOW ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS CAN IMPROVE THEIR FEEDBACK MECHANISMS
	Li, Lingfang (Ivy)
刊名	JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
	2010-06
卷号	19 期号:2 页码:303-331
ISSN号	1058-6407
英文摘要	Reputation systems constitute an important institution, helping sustain trust in online auction markets. However, only half of buyers leave feedback after transactions, and nearly all feedback is positive. In this paper, I propose a mechanism whereby sellers can provide rebates (not necessarily in monetary form) to buyers contingent upon buyers' provision of reports. Using a game theoretical model, I show how the mechanism can increase unbiased reporting. There exists a pooling equilibrium where both good and bad sellers choose the rebate option, even though their true types are revealed through feedback. The mechanism also induces bad sellers to improve the quality of the contract.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	WILEY-BLACKWELL
WOS记录号	WOS:000277272900002
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/2385]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Li, Lingfang (Ivy)
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li, Lingfang . REPUTATION, TRUST, AND REBATES: HOW ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS CAN IMPROVE THEIR FEEDBACK MECHANISMS[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,2010,19(2):303-331.
APA	Li, Lingfang .(2010).REPUTATION, TRUST, AND REBATES: HOW ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS CAN IMPROVE THEIR FEEDBACK MECHANISMS.JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY,19(2),303-331.
MLA	Li, Lingfang ."REPUTATION, TRUST, AND REBATES: HOW ONLINE AUCTION MARKETS CAN IMPROVE THEIR FEEDBACK MECHANISMS".JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 19.2(2010):303-331.