Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining
	Zhang, Jun 1; Wang, Ruqu 2,3,4
刊名	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
	2013-09
卷号	148 期号:5 页码:2096-2123
关键词	Auctions Mechanism design Resale Bargaining power
ISSN号	0022-0531
DOI	10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.013
英文摘要	In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully characterize an optimal mechanism under general conditions. Surprisingly, in this optimal mechanism, the seller never allocates the object to the regular buyer regardless of his bargaining power in the resale market. The seller sells only to the publicly known buyer, and reveals no additional information to the resale market. The possibility of resale causes the seller to sometimes hold back the object, which under our setup is never optimal if resale is prohibited. We find that the seller's revenue is increasing in the publicly known buyer's bargaining power in the resale market. When the publicly known buyer has full bargaining power, Myerson's optimal revenue is achieved; when the publicly known buyer has no bargaining power, a conditionally efficient mechanism prevails. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000326206400014
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/1937]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Zhang, Jun
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Queens Univ, Dept Econ, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada; 3.Zhejiang Univ, Sch Econ, Hangzhou 310003, Zhejiang, Peoples R China; 4.Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang, Jun,Wang, Ruqu. Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,2013,148(5):2096-2123.
APA	Zhang, Jun,&Wang, Ruqu.(2013).Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,148(5),2096-2123.
MLA	Zhang, Jun,et al."Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining".JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 148.5(2013):2096-2123.