Economics of leadership and hierarchy

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.012

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	Economics of leadership and hierarchy
	Zhou, Junjie
刊名	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
	2016-01
卷号	95 页码:88-106
关键词	Organization design Hierarchy Leadership Free-riding Dynamic signaling Lead by example
ISSN号	0899-8256
DOI	10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.012
英文摘要	This paper explores leadership within hierarchical organizations. For each hierarchy, I consider a dynamic signaling game in which each player observes only the actions of his direct superiors before choosing his action. At the top of the hierarchy are the leaders, who learn the state from nature. The hierarchy controls the flow of information and the timing of the game, and determines the equilibrium output and welfare. I show that the welfare-optimal hierarchy is the chain, because it maximizes the incentive of players to "lead by example" for their subordinates. The chain remains optimal even in the presence of verifiable or unverifiable costly information acquisition by the leaders. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000371561900008
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/1396]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Zhou, Junjie
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhou, Junjie. Economics of leadership and hierarchy[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,2016,95:88-106.
APA	Zhou, Junjie.(2016).Economics of leadership and hierarchy.GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR,95,88-106.
MLA	Zhou, Junjie."Economics of leadership and hierarchy".GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 95(2016):88-106.