Targeted Information Release in Social Networks

doi:10.1287/opre.2015.1431

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Targeted Information Release in Social Networks
	Zhou, Junjie 1; Chen, Ying-Ju 2,3
刊名	OPERATIONS RESEARCH
	2016-05-01
卷号	64 期号:3 页码:721-735
关键词	social network signaling information management targeted advertising game theory
ISSN号	0030-364X
DOI	10.1287/opre.2015.1431
英文摘要	As various firms initially make information and access to their products/services scarce within a social network, identifying influential players emerges as a pivotal step for their success. In this paper, we tackle this problem using a stylized model that features payoff externalities and local network effects. The network designer is allowed to release information to only a subset of players (leaders); these targeted players make their contributions first and the rest (followers) move subsequently after observing the leaders' decisions. In the presence of incomplete information, the signaling incentive drives the optimal selection of leaders and can lead to a first-order materialistic effect on equilibrium contributions.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Operations Research & Management Science
语种	英语
出版者	INFORMS
WOS记录号	WOS:000377979900011
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/1294]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Zhou, Junjie
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China; 2.Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China; 3.Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Engn, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhou, Junjie,Chen, Ying-Ju. Targeted Information Release in Social Networks[J]. OPERATIONS RESEARCH,2016,64(3):721-735.
APA	Zhou, Junjie,&Chen, Ying-Ju.(2016).Targeted Information Release in Social Networks.OPERATIONS RESEARCH,64(3),721-735.
MLA	Zhou, Junjie,et al."Targeted Information Release in Social Networks".OPERATIONS RESEARCH 64.3(2016):721-735.