A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.004

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
	Liu, Zhiyang 1; Chen, Bo 2,3
刊名	ECONOMICS LETTERS
	2016-08
卷号	145 页码:6-10
关键词	All-pay auction Correlated types Symmetric equilibrium
ISSN号	0165-1765
DOI	10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.004
英文摘要	We construct both monotonic and non-monotonic symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two player all-pay contest with binary types and correlated information structures. We also employ a class of parametric distributions to illustrate our equilibrium construction explicitly and to derive some comparative statics results. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
WOS记录号	WOS:000381834600002
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/1234]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Chen, Bo
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Int Business Adm, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Southern Methodist Univ, Dept Econ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA; 3.Zhejiang Univ, Sch Econ, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Liu, Zhiyang,Chen, Bo. A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS,2016,145:6-10.
APA	Liu, Zhiyang,&Chen, Bo.(2016).A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information.ECONOMICS LETTERS,145,6-10.
MLA	Liu, Zhiyang,et al."A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information".ECONOMICS LETTERS 145(2016):6-10.