Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design | |
Gravin, Nick; Lu, Pinian | |
刊名 | SI GECOM EXCHANGES
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2018-06 | |
卷号 | 16期号:2页码:45-52 |
ISSN号 | 1551-9031 |
英文摘要 | In this letter, we discuss the correlation-robust framework proposed by Carroll [Econometrica 2017] and our new development [SODA 2018]. Consider a monopolist seller that has n heterogeneous items to sell to a single buyer with the objective of maximizing the seller's revenue. In the correlation-robust framework, the seller only knows marginal distribution of each item but has no information about the correlation across different items in the joint distribution. Any mechanism is then evaluated according to its expected profit in the worst-case over all possible joint distributions with the given marginal distributions. Carroll's main result states that when the buyer's value for any set of her items is the sum of the values of individual items in the set, the optimal correlation-robust mechanism should sell items separately. We extend this result to the case where the buyer has a budget constraint on her total payment. Namely, we show that the optimal robust mechanism splits the total budget in a fixed way across different items independent of the bids, and then sells each item separately with a per item budget constraint. |
WOS研究方向 | Computer Science |
语种 | 英语 |
出版者 | ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000444649100006 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/601] ![]() |
专题 | 上海财经大学 |
通讯作者 | Gravin, Nick |
作者单位 | Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, ITCS, Shanghai, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gravin, Nick,Lu, Pinian. Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design[J]. SI GECOM EXCHANGES,2018,16(2):45-52. |
APA | Gravin, Nick,&Lu, Pinian.(2018).Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design.SI GECOM EXCHANGES,16(2),45-52. |
MLA | Gravin, Nick,et al."Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design".SI GECOM EXCHANGES 16.2(2018):45-52. |
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