Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design

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	Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design
	Gravin, Nick; Lu, Pinian
刊名	SI GECOM EXCHANGES
	2018-06
卷号	16 期号:2 页码:45-52
ISSN号	1551-9031
英文摘要	In this letter, we discuss the correlation-robust framework proposed by Carroll [Econometrica 2017] and our new development [SODA 2018]. Consider a monopolist seller that has n heterogeneous items to sell to a single buyer with the objective of maximizing the seller's revenue. In the correlation-robust framework, the seller only knows marginal distribution of each item but has no information about the correlation across different items in the joint distribution. Any mechanism is then evaluated according to its expected profit in the worst-case over all possible joint distributions with the given marginal distributions. Carroll's main result states that when the buyer's value for any set of her items is the sum of the values of individual items in the set, the optimal correlation-robust mechanism should sell items separately. We extend this result to the case where the buyer has a budget constraint on her total payment. Namely, we show that the optimal robust mechanism splits the total budget in a fixed way across different items independent of the bids, and then sells each item separately with a per item budget constraint.
WOS研究方向	Computer Science
语种	英语
出版者	ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
WOS记录号	WOS:000444649100006
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/601]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Gravin, Nick
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, ITCS, Shanghai, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gravin, Nick,Lu, Pinian. Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design[J]. SI GECOM EXCHANGES,2018,16(2):45-52.
APA	Gravin, Nick,&Lu, Pinian.(2018).Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design.SI GECOM EXCHANGES,16(2),45-52.
MLA	Gravin, Nick,et al."Correlation-Robust Mechanism Design".SI GECOM EXCHANGES 16.2(2018):45-52.