Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in   Continuous Public Goods Games

CORC > 北京大学 > 工学院

	Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games
	Feng Xue ; Zhang Yanling ; Wang Long
	2016
关键词	Direct Reciprocity Cooperation Iterated Continuous Public Goods Games Adaptive Dynamics Finite Populations CONTINUOUS PRISONERS-DILEMMA EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS VARIABLE INVESTMENT COOPERATION STRATEGIES DEFECTION IMPALA ORIGIN
英文摘要	Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Iterated games provide a game theoretic framework for studying the evolution of cooperation through direct reciprocity. Here, we study the iterated two-player continuous public goods game in finite populations by adaptive dynamics. We consider that cooperative investments are determined by the initial investment and the reciprocation rate which describes the relation between a player's current investment and its opponent's last investment. Many previous models neglect the interaction between the initial investment and the reciprocation rate and investigate them separately. Thus, it is still unclear how the coevolution of these two traits influences the game dynamics. Here, we study their coevolution. Mean strategies and generous ones are proposed. Players who adopt the former (latter) always invest no more (less) than what their opponents did in the last round. We find that the evolutionary fate of a mean population is entirely determined by the reciprocation rate: if it exceeds a threshold, the population evolves to full cooperation; otherwise, it evolves to full defection. For a generous population, full cooperation is always achieved.; National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [61375120, 61533001]; CPCI-S(ISTP); 10390-10395
会议录	35th Chinese Control Conference (CCC)
语种	英语
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/470228]
专题	工学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Feng Xue,Zhang Yanling,Wang Long. Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games[C]. 见:.