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Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games; Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games
FENG Xue ; ZHANG Yanling ; WANG Long
2016
关键词Direct Reciprocity Cooperation Iterated Continuous Public Goods Games Adaptive Dynamics Finite Populations Direct Reciprocity Cooperation Iterated Continuous Public Goods Games Adaptive Dynamics Finite Populations
英文摘要Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Iterated games provide a game theoretic framework for studying the evolution of cooperation through direct reciprocity. Here, we study the iterated two-player continuous public goods game in finite populations by adaptive dynamics. ...; Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. Iterated games provide a game theoretic framework for studying the evolution of cooperation through direct reciprocity. Here, we study the iterated two-player continuous public goods game in finite populations by adaptive dynamics. ...; 中国自动化学会控制理论专业委员会、中国系统工程学会; 6
会议录第35届中国控制会议
语种英语
内容类型会议论文
源URL[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/457919]  
专题工学院
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
FENG Xue,ZHANG Yanling,WANG Long. Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games, Coevolutionary Dynamics of Initial Investment and Reciprocation Rate in Continuous Public Goods Games[C]. 见:.
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