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	Evolutionary Intelligence and Complexity Management in Social Economic Systems
	Wang, Jing ; Zhu, Mei ; Ren, Fujun ; Wang, Long
	2009
关键词	Threshold Public Goods Game Social Economic Systems Replicator Dynamics THRESHOLD PUBLIC-GOODS VOLUNTARY PROVISION GAMES COOPERATION DYNAMICS EMERGENCE
英文摘要	In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective theoretical model for the evolutionary threshold public goods game with binary contributions (each individual makes decision to contribute a fixed donation amount or nothing), incorporating the effect of the collective risk. In order to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of the collective cooperative behavior, we analyze the population dynamics represented by the replicator equation. The result shows that high risk rate can enhance the emergence of social cooperation as well as the provision of public goods. Besides, other elements can also promote the cooperation, such as large initial endowment, small threshold, large cost of cooperation below the baseline of each cooperator, and large group size. In addition, our model can lead to rich dynamics. Scenarios of defection dominance, cooperation and defection bistable, cooperation and defection coexistence, and cooperation dominance may appear successively with the change of parameters,; http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000274047200012&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=8e1609b174ce4e31116a60747a720701 ; Automation & Control Systems; Engineering, Electrical & Electronic; EI; CPCI-S(ISTP); 0
语种	英语
DOI标识	10.1109/CCDC.2009.5195149
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/155198]
专题	工学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Jing,Zhu, Mei,Ren, Fujun,et al. Evolutionary Intelligence and Complexity Management in Social Economic Systems. 2009-01-01.

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