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	Tournament based incentive mechanism designs for mobile crowdsourcing
	Zhang, Yanru ; Gu, Yunan ; Song, Lingyang ; Pan, Miao ; Dawy, Zaher ; Han, Zhu
	2015
英文摘要	With the wide adoption of smart mobile devices, there is rapid development of location based services. One key feature of supporting a pleasant/excellent service is the access to adequate and comprehensive data, which can be obtained by mobile crowdsourcing. The main challenge in crowdsourcing is how the service provider (principal) incentivize a large group of mobile users to participate. In this paper, we investigate the problem of designing a tournament to provide continuous incentives for users by rewarding them based on the rank achieved in crowdsourcing. First, we model the user's utility of reward from achieving one of the winning ranks in the tournament. Then, the utility maximization problem of the principal is formulated, under the constraint that the user maximizes its own utility by choosing the optimal effort in the crowdsourcing tournament. Furthermore, we show that, the tournament can approximate the optimal contract under full information by step function. Finally, we present numerical results to compare the system performance under the different proposed incentive mechanisms; we show that by using the tournament, the users obtain the continuous incentives to participate in the crowdsourcing activity. ? 2015 IEEE.; EI
语种	英语
出处	58th IEEE Global Communications Conference, GLOBECOM 2015
DOI标识	10.1109/GLOCOM.2014.7417515
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/436284]
专题	信息科学技术学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang, Yanru,Gu, Yunan,Song, Lingyang,et al. Tournament based incentive mechanism designs for mobile crowdsourcing. 2015-01-01.

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