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	Game analysis on institution defects of mode for construction land supply in China small towns
	Ou, Xiong ; Liu, Ji Wen ; Jin, Jie
	2006
英文摘要	In China small towns, the problems existing in current supply mode of collective construction land come from its institution defects, which focus on the incompletion of collective land use rights. Applying game theory to build game model, this paper analyzes the game relationships and action choices among different interest groups during the process of current collective construction land supply respectively. The game model analysis shows that the final optimal equilibrium should be the collective construction land owners (CCLOs) trading their land use rights on open market when institution innovating, and the State upgrading its collective construction land supply institution correspondingly, and when this condition satisfied, both sides could realize their maximum of utilities. Based on the game analysis, the primary tasks of collective construction land supply institution innovation are put forward, which are to endow collective construction land with complete land-use rights, distinguish the property rights, affirm land supply body, and consummate the distribution mechanism of return.; EI; 539-545; 1
语种	英语
出处	International Research Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, CRIOCM 2006
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://ir.pku.edu.cn/handle/20.500.11897/461695]
专题	城市与环境学院
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ou, Xiong,Liu, Ji Wen,Jin, Jie. Game analysis on institution defects of mode for construction land supply in China small towns. 2006-01-01.

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