QQ客服 官方微博 反馈留言

	An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks
	Takahashi, Hiromasa[1]; Shen, Junyi[2]; Ogawa, Kazuhito[3]
刊名	JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
	2016
卷号	61页码:12-19
关键词	Real effort experiment Intrinsic motivation Loss aversion Fixed pay Incentive pay
ISSN号	2214-8043
URL标识	查看原文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2234780
专题	上海大学
作者单位	1.[1]Hiroshima City Univ, Fac Int Srudies, Asaminami Ku, 3-4-1 Ozuka Higashi, Hiroshima 7313194, Japan. 2.[2]Kobe Univ, Res Inst Econ & Business Adm, 2-1 Rokkodai, Kobe, Hyogo 6578501, Japan.,Shanghai Univ, Sch Econ, 99 Shangda Rd, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China. 3.[3]Kansai Univ, Fac Sociol, 3-3-35 Yamate Cho, Suita, Osaka 5648680, Japan.,Kansai Univ, Ctr Expt Econ, 3-3-35 Yamate Cho, Suita, Osaka 5648680, Japan.
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Takahashi, Hiromasa[1],Shen, Junyi[2],Ogawa, Kazuhito[3]. An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks[J]. JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS,2016,61:12-19.
APA	Takahashi, Hiromasa[1],Shen, Junyi[2],&Ogawa, Kazuhito[3].(2016).An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks.JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS,61,12-19.
MLA	Takahashi, Hiromasa[1],et al."An experimental examination of compensation schemes and level of effort in differentiated tasks".JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 61(2016):12-19.

个性服务

查看访问统计

相关权益政策

暂无数据

收藏/分享

除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。