QQ客服 官方微博 反馈留言

	Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China
	Bing Zhang; Xiaolan Chen; Huanxiu Guo
刊名	Journal of Public Economics
	2018
卷号	Vol.164页码:70-90
关键词	Environmental federalism Central supervision Water pollution Regression discontinuity design China
ISSN号	0047-2727
URL标识	查看原文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/1869602
专题	四川大学
作者单位	1.Nanjing Univ, Sch Environm, State Key Lab Pollut Control & Resource Reuse, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China 2.Nanjing Audit Univ, Inst Econ & Finance, Nanjing, Jiangsu, Peoples R China 3.Sichuan Univ, Sch Econ, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Bing Zhang,Xiaolan Chen,Huanxiu Guo. Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China[J]. Journal of Public Economics,2018,Vol.164:70-90.
APA	Bing Zhang,Xiaolan Chen,&Huanxiu Guo.(2018).Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China.Journal of Public Economics,Vol.164,70-90.
MLA	Bing Zhang,et al."Does central supervision enhance local environmental enforcement? Quasi-experimental evidence from China".Journal of Public Economics Vol.164(2018):70-90.

个性服务

查看访问统计

相关权益政策

暂无数据

收藏/分享

除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。