DAA-related APIs in TPM 2.0 revisited | |
Xi, Li (1) ; Yang, Kang (1) ; Zhang, Zhenfeng (1) ; Feng, Dengguo (1) | |
2014 | |
会议名称 | 7th International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2014 |
会议日期 | June 30, 2014 - July 2, 2014 |
会议地点 | Heraklion, Crete, Greece |
页码 | 1-18 |
中文摘要 | In TPM 2.0, a single signature primitive is proposed to support various signature schemes including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), U-Prove and Schnorr signature. This signature primitive is implemented by several APIs which can be utilized as a static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) oracle. In this paper, we measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0 and show the security strength of these signature schemes can be weakened by 13-bit. We propose a novel property of DAA called forward anonymity and show how to utilize these DAA-related APIs to break forward anonymity. Then we propose new APIs which not only remove the SDH oracle but also support the forward anonymity, thus significantly improve the security of DAA and the other signature schemes supported by TPM 2.0. We prove the security of our new APIs under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. We prove that the proposed DAA schemes satisfied the forward anonymity property using the new APIs under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our new APIs are almost as efficient as the original APIs in TPM 2.0 specification and can support LRSW-DAA and SDH-DAA together with U-Prove as the original APIs. © 2014 Springer International Publishing. |
英文摘要 | In TPM 2.0, a single signature primitive is proposed to support various signature schemes including Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA), U-Prove and Schnorr signature. This signature primitive is implemented by several APIs which can be utilized as a static Diffie-Hellman (SDH) oracle. In this paper, we measure the practical impact of the SDH oracle in TPM 2.0 and show the security strength of these signature schemes can be weakened by 13-bit. We propose a novel property of DAA called forward anonymity and show how to utilize these DAA-related APIs to break forward anonymity. Then we propose new APIs which not only remove the SDH oracle but also support the forward anonymity, thus significantly improve the security of DAA and the other signature schemes supported by TPM 2.0. We prove the security of our new APIs under the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. We prove that the proposed DAA schemes satisfied the forward anonymity property using the new APIs under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Our new APIs are almost as efficient as the original APIs in TPM 2.0 specification and can support LRSW-DAA and SDH-DAA together with U-Prove as the original APIs. © 2014 Springer International Publishing. |
收录类别 | EI |
会议录出版地 | Springer Verlag |
语种 | 英语 |
ISSN号 | 3029743 |
ISBN号 | 9783319085920 |
内容类型 | 会议论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16577] ![]() |
专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xi, Li ,Yang, Kang ,Zhang, Zhenfeng ,et al. DAA-related APIs in TPM 2.0 revisited[C]. 见:7th International Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, TRUST 2014. Heraklion, Crete, Greece. June 30, 2014 - July 2, 2014. |
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