improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha

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	improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha
	Shi Zhenqing ; Zhang Bin ; Feng Dengguo ; Wu Wenling
	2013
会议名称	15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
会议日期	November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012
会议地点	Seoul, Korea, Republic of
关键词	Security of data
页码	337-351
中文摘要	Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
英文摘要	Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
收录类别	EI
会议录	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
语种	英语
ISSN号	0302-9743
ISBN号	9783642376818
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15979]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Shi Zhenqing,Zhang Bin,Feng Dengguo,et al. improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012.