improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha | |
Shi Zhenqing ; Zhang Bin ; Feng Dengguo ; Wu Wenling | |
2013 | |
会议名称 | 15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012 |
会议日期 | November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012 |
会议地点 | Seoul, Korea, Republic of |
关键词 | Security of data |
页码 | 337-351 |
中文摘要 | Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
英文摘要 | Salsa20 is a stream cipher designed by Bernstein in 2005 and Salsa20/12 has been selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 with faster diffusion for similar performance. The previous best results on Salsa20 and ChaCha proposed by Aumasson et al. exploits the differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB). In this paper, we extend their approach by considering a new type of distinguishers, named (column and row) chaining distinguishers. Besides, we exhibit new high probability second-order differential trails not covered by the previous methods, generalize the notion of PNB to probabilistic neutral vectors (PNV) and show that the set of PNV is no smaller than that of PNB. Based on these findings, we present improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha. Both time and data complexities of our attacks are smaller than those of the best former results. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
收录类别 | EI |
会议录 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
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语种 | 英语 |
ISSN号 | 0302-9743 |
ISBN号 | 9783642376818 |
内容类型 | 会议论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15979] ![]() |
专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shi Zhenqing,Zhang Bin,Feng Dengguo,et al. improved key recovery attacks on reduced-round salsa20 and chacha[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012. |
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