cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage

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	cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage
	Li Zhenqi ; Zhang Bin ; Yao Yuan ; Lin Dongdai
	2013
会议名称	15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012
会议日期	November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012
会议地点	Seoul, Korea, Republic of
关键词	Geometry Security of data
页码	141-155
中文摘要	In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 ^10.7 time and 2^7.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 2¹⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions and 2^11.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 2³⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions with 2^8.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
英文摘要	In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 ^10.7 time and 2^7.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 2¹⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions and 2^11.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 2³⁰ 32-round LBlock encryptions with 2^8.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
收录类别	EI
会议录	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
语种	英语
ISSN号	0302-9743
ISBN号	9783642376818
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15975]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li Zhenqi,Zhang Bin,Yao Yuan,et al. cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012.