cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage | |
Li Zhenqi ; Zhang Bin ; Yao Yuan ; Lin Dongdai | |
2013 | |
会议名称 | 15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012 |
会议日期 | November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012 |
会议地点 | Seoul, Korea, Republic of |
关键词 | Geometry Security of data |
页码 | 141-155 |
中文摘要 | In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 10.7 time and 27.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 210 32-round LBlock encryptions and 211.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 230 32-round LBlock encryptions with 28.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
英文摘要 | In this paper, we present some side channel cube attacks on LBlock, a lightweight block cipher proposed at ACNS 2011. It is shown that in the single bit leakage model, 14 bits of the secret key can be recovered with 2 10.7 time and 27.6 chosen plaintexts, captured the 44th state bit of the third round. In the Hamming weight leakage model, the full 80-bit key can be retrieved with only 210 32-round LBlock encryptions and 211.1 chosen plaintexts, given the leakage of the second least significant bit (LSB) of the Hamming weight after the third round. We also provide a rigorous analysis on the error tolerance probabilities of our attacks and show that the full 80-bit key can be restored in 230 32-round LBlock encryptions with 28.5 chosen plaintexts and at most 5.5% of the noisy leaked bits in the LSB of the Hamming weight after the second round. Many of the ideas in our attacks are applicable to other block ciphers as well. © 2013 Springer-Verlag. |
收录类别 | EI |
会议录 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
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语种 | 英语 |
ISSN号 | 0302-9743 |
ISBN号 | 9783642376818 |
内容类型 | 会议论文 |
源URL | [http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15975] ![]() |
专题 | 软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Li Zhenqi,Zhang Bin,Yao Yuan,et al. cube cryptanalysis of lblock with noisy leakage[C]. 见:15th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ICISC 2012. Seoul, Korea, Republic of. November 28, 2012 - November 30, 2012. |
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