new observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia

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	new observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia
	Liu Ya ; Li Leibo ; Gu Dawu ; Wang Xiaoyun ; Liu Zhiqiang ; Chen Jiazhe ; Li Wei
	2012
会议名称	19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2012
会议日期	March 19, 2012 - March 21, 2012
会议地点	Washington, DC, United states
关键词	Lyapunov methods Security of data
页码	90-109
中文摘要	Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two FL/FL^-1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
英文摘要	Camellia is one of the widely used block ciphers, which has been selected as an international standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, by exploiting some interesting properties of the key-dependent layer, we improve previous results on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round Camellia and gain some new observations. First, we introduce some new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia for weak keys. These weak keys that work for the impossible differential take 3/4 of the whole key space, therefore, we further get rid of the weak-key assumption and leverage the attacks on reduced-round Camellia to all keys by utilizing the multiplied method. Second, we build a set of differentials which contains at least one 8-round impossible differential of Camellia with two FL/FL^-1 layers. Following this new result, we show that the key-dependent transformations inserted in Camellia cannot resist impossible differential cryptanalysis effectively. Based on this set of differentials, we present a new cryptanalytic strategy to mount impossible differential attacks on reduced-round Camellia. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
收录类别	EI
会议录	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
语种	英语
ISSN号	0302-9743
ISBN号	9783642340468
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/15767]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Liu Ya,Li Leibo,Gu Dawu,et al. new observations on impossible differential cryptanalysis of reduced-round camellia[C]. 见:19th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2012. Washington, DC, United states. March 19, 2012 - March 21, 2012.