a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis

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	a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis
	Sun Xiaoshan ; Cheng Liang ; Zhang Yang
	2011
会议名称	2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011
会议日期	5-Jun-20
会议地点	Kyoto, Japan
关键词	Access control Algorithms Computational complexity Design
页码	-
英文摘要	A covert channel is a communication channel that bypasses the access controls of the system, and it is a threat to the system's security. In this paper, we propose a new covert timing channel which exploits the algorithmic complexity vulnerabilities in the name lookup algorithm of the kernel. This covert channel has a high capacity and it is practically exploitable. In our experiments, the data rate reaches 2256 bps under a very low error rate. This data rate is high enough for practical use. So our covert channel is dangerous. To our knowledge, no previous works propose this covert channel nor implement it. We describe our design and implementation of the covert channel on a SELinux system, discuss the subtle issues that arose in the design, present performance data of the covert channel and analyse its capacity. © 2011 IEEE.
收录类别	EI
会议主办者	IEEE Communication Society; IEICE Communications Society; Science Council of Japan
会议录	IEEE International Conference on Communications
会议录出版地	United States
语种	英语
ISSN号	5361486
ISBN号	9781612842332
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://124.16.136.157/handle/311060/14393]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Sun Xiaoshan,Cheng Liang,Zhang Yang. a covert timing channel via algorithmic complexity attacks: design and analysis[C]. 见:2011 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2011. Kyoto, Japan. 5-Jun-20.