distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators

CORC > 软件研究所 > 软件所图书馆 > 期刊论文

	distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators
	Li Xuelian ; Gao Juntao ; Hu Yupu ; Zhang Fengrong
刊名	Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University
	2012
卷号	39 期号:4 页码:114-119
关键词	Cryptography Polynomials Shift registers
ISSN号	1001-2400
中文摘要	With simple construction and easy implementation, the generalized self-shrinking generator is a keystream generator intended to be used as a stream cipher. This paper investigates the security of the generalized self-shrinking generator. We propose two distinguishing attacks on the generalized self-shrinking sequences by using the feedback polynomial and the sequence v. The results show that the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack by choosing the h^w-1 keystream bit of the generalized self-shrinking generator, if the feedback polynomial f(x) is of hamming weight w and degree h. On the other hand, if the hamming weight of f(x) is low, then the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack, and the attack complexity depends on the weight of f(x). Therefore, neither type of the polynomials can be chosen as the feedback polynomials of the generalized self-shrinking generator. Users should choose the feedback polynomial carefully, otherwise the stream cipher can suffer from distinguishing attacks.
英文摘要	With simple construction and easy implementation, the generalized self-shrinking generator is a keystream generator intended to be used as a stream cipher. This paper investigates the security of the generalized self-shrinking generator. We propose two distinguishing attacks on the generalized self-shrinking sequences by using the feedback polynomial and the sequence v. The results show that the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack by choosing the h^w-1 keystream bit of the generalized self-shrinking generator, if the feedback polynomial f(x) is of hamming weight w and degree h. On the other hand, if the hamming weight of f(x) is low, then the attacker can launch a distinguishing attack, and the attack complexity depends on the weight of f(x). Therefore, neither type of the polynomials can be chosen as the feedback polynomials of the generalized self-shrinking generator. Users should choose the feedback polynomial carefully, otherwise the stream cipher can suffer from distinguishing attacks.
收录类别	EI
语种	中文
公开日期	2013-09-17
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/14987]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_期刊论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li Xuelian,Gao Juntao,Hu Yupu,et al. distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators[J]. Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University,2012,39(4):114-119.
APA	Li Xuelian,Gao Juntao,Hu Yupu,&Zhang Fengrong.(2012).distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators.Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University,39(4),114-119.
MLA	Li Xuelian,et al."distinguishing attacks on generalized self-shrinking generators".Xi'an Dianzi Keji Daxue Xuebao/Journal of Xidian University 39.4(2012):114-119.