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	股东与管理者合作博弈关系分析——基于利益相关者企业契约理论的视角; Along with the Analysis of Cooperative Game between Shareholders and Managers:Evidence for Stakeholders and Enterprise Contract Theory
	南星恒 ; XingHeng Nan
	2014-12
关键词	利益相关者 Stakeholders 企业契约理论 enterprise contract theory 合作博弈 cooperative game
英文摘要	【中文摘要】随着市场经济的日益发达及企业组织的演化，公司股东与管理者的关系越加复杂，并成为制约企业发展的制度瓶颈，传统经济学理论难以有效地破解这一难题。本文试图借用青木昌彦合作博弈理论与模型从利益相关者企业契约论的视角，将企业视为一个具有法律意义的契约集合体，将股东和管理者作为企业的核心利益相关者，从资本投资与利益诉求的角度研究二者的合作博弈关系。同时，在理论分析与模型构建中修正了青木昌彦关于管理者作为企业员工和股东之间的仲裁者身份的基本假设，从利益相关者投资与收益的角度更为清晰地讨论股东和管理者作为不同资本所有者的利益关系，从而有效地破解了传统委托代理理论的悖论。 【Abstract】Along with the development of market economy and the evolution of the organization of enterprise, the relationship between company shareholders and managers gets more complicated， become system bottleneck that restricts the development of the company， which cannot be solved effectively by the traditional economics theory. From stakeholders enterprise contract theory， this paper is mainly based on the cooperative game theory model of Aoki Masahiko， treats company as a law contract aggregation， and make shareholders and managers as the company's core stakeholders， in order to study cooperative game relationship from perspective of the capital investment and the interest appeals. Meanwhile，in the theoretical analysis and the model construction，this paper corrects basic assumptions of Aoki Masahiko theory which serves manager as a mediator between employees and shareholders， and clearly discusses the interests of shareholders and managers as different capital owners based on the stakeholders’ investment and interests，thereby effectively cracks theory paradox of traditional principal-agent theory.; 国家社会科学基金项目“组织学习行为与智力资本理论研究”（11BGL017)
语种	中文
出版者	厦门大学《当代会计评论》编辑部
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/98247]
专题	2014年第7卷
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	南星恒,XingHeng Nan. 股东与管理者合作博弈关系分析——基于利益相关者企业契约理论的视角, Along with the Analysis of Cooperative Game between Shareholders and Managers:Evidence for Stakeholders and Enterprise Contract Theory. 2014-12-01.

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