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	Man Versus Nash: An Experiment on the Self-enforcing Nature of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
	Jason Shachat ; J. Todd Swarthouty ; Lijia Wei
	2013-11-08
出处	http://www.wise.xmu.edu.cn/paperInfor.asp?id=200
关键词	Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Experiment Hidden Markov Model JEL Classification C92 C72 C10
英文摘要	We examine experimentally how humans behave when they play against a computer which implements its part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We consider two games, one zero-sum and another unprofitable with a pure minimax strategy. A minority of subjects' play was consistent with their Nash equilibrium strategy, while a larger percentage of subjects' play was more consistent with different models of play: equiprobable play for the zero-sum game, and the minimax strategy in the unprofitable game. We estimate the heterogeneity and dynamics of the subjects' latent mixed strategy sequences via a hidden Markov model. This provides clear results on the identification of the use of pure and mixed strategies and the limiting distribution over strategies. The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is not self-enforcing except when it coincides with the equal probability mixed strategy, and there is surprising amounts of pure strategy play and clear cycling between the pure strategy states.
语种	中文
内容类型	研究报告
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/56795]
专题	王亚南院－工作文稿
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jason Shachat,J. Todd Swarthouty,Lijia Wei   . Man Versus Nash: An Experiment on the Self-enforcing Nature of Mixed Strategy Equilibrium. 2013.

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