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	Does E-commerce Reputation Mechanism Matter?
	Zhang, Li-fang ; Zhang, Fu-jing ; Zhang LF(张丽芳)
	2011
关键词	ELECTRONIC MARKETS SELECTION AUCTIONS TRUST
英文摘要	Conference Name:International Conference on Advanced in Control Engineering and Information Science (CEIS). Conference Address: Dali, PEOPLES R CHINA. Time:AUG 18-19, 2011.; Asymmetric information is considered a common issue across E-commerce platforms. Reputation mechanism is introduced to solve this problem. By using the transaction data from Taobao, the largest C2C platform in China, this paper does empirical study on the relationship between sellers' reputation and sales. The estimation results show that the impact is non-linear. Below the reputation threshold level, sales decrease with improved reputation. Above the threshold level, sales increase with improved reputation. Positive feedback ratio, negative feedback ratio and price are not the deciding factor on sales. When there are certain factors strengthening trust, sales even have positive relationship with price. In the absence of legal framework of reputation, the platform-specific reputation mechanism and trading history play the most important role in consumers' decision process. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011]
语种	英语
出处	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.proeng.2011.08.910
出版者	PROCEDIA ENGINEER
内容类型	其他
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/85596]
专题	经济学院－会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Zhang, Li-fang,Zhang, Fu-jing,Zhang LF. Does E-commerce Reputation Mechanism Matter?. 2011-01-01.

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