| 约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗; Does Constraining Assessment Enhance the officials' Incentives to Reduce Emission? | |
| 袁凯华 ; 李后建 ; 林章悦 | |
| 2014-11-15 | |
| 关键词 | 约束性考核 外溢性物品 倍差法 策略性减排 Constraining Assessment Spillover Goods Fold Difference Method Strategic Emission Reduction |
| 英文摘要 | 本文利用1997-2012年间的相关数据,借助于倍差模型,分析了约束性考核政策是否纠正了以往环境激励不足带来的短视行为。实证分析发现:约束性考核不仅未能从根本上纠正环境激励缺失造成的短视行为,更进一步强化了晋升压力下政治官员的“策略性“选择行为,使得强外溢性、非约束性指标沦为当前政策体系的环境牺牲品,从而也为步步紧逼环境压力下的大气污染尤其是“雾霾“现象提供了一个合理解释。立足于激励角度,本文研究丰富和拓展了环境污染的相关文献,为进一步理解地方官员与节能减排之间的联系提供了新的经验证据。; This paper analyzes whether constraining assessment policy corrects the short-sighted behaviors brought by the past insufficient environment incentive by using the relevant data from 1997 to 2012 with the aid of fold difference model.Empirical analysis finds: constraining assessment not only can't radically correct short-sighted behaviors caused by loss of environment incentive,but also it intensifies the"tactical"selection behaviors of political officials under the pressure of promotion and makes the strong spillover and unconstraint indicators be environment sacrifices under current policy system and also provides a reasonable explanation for the atmosphere pollution,especially"mist"phenomenon.This paper enriches and expands the relevant documents on environmental pollution from the perspective of incentive and provides new empirical evidence for understanding the link between the local officials and energy saving and emission reduction.; 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“中国式分权下的地方政府质量提升路径研究”(编号:12CJL022) |
| 语种 | zh_CN |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 源URL | [http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/103223]  |
| 专题 | 管理学院－已发表论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 袁凯华,李后建,林章悦. 约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗, Does Constraining Assessment Enhance the officials' Incentives to Reduce Emission?[J],2014. |
| APA | 袁凯华,李后建,&林章悦.(2014).约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗.. |
| MLA | 袁凯华,et al."约束性考核促进了官员的减排激励吗".(2014). |
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