| 中国上市公司可转债发行动因:“后门权益”VS“代理成本”; The Motive of Issuing Convertible Bonds in China's Stock Market:"Back Door Equity" VS "Agency Cost" | |
| 屈文洲 ; 林振兴 | |
| 2009 | |
| 关键词 | 可转债 发行动因 财富效应 后门权益 convertible bonds issuer motives wealth effects back door equity |
| 英文摘要 | 本文以中国上市公司2002—2008年发行的可转债为研究样本进行实证研究,发现可转债发行公告的财富效应与该可转债实现转股可能性的预期正相关,具体而言,与发行公司的成长机会、财务困境风险水平正相关,并且与整体股市的状况也紧密相关。进一步结合可转债退市的分析表明,中国上市公司可转债融资是一种典型的“后门权益“融资。实证研究的结果不支持基于代理成本的动因假说。; We study the announcement effects and their determinants of convertible debt issues between 2002 and 2008 in China's stock market in order to identify issuer motives.We find that the wealth effect for the event window around the announcement of convertible bonds is significantly related to the possibility of the respective bonds being converted into stocks in the future, specifically, the growth opportunity and the cost of financial distress as well as the overall situation of the aggregate stock market.We furhter investigate the delisting of convertible bonds.Our findings suggests that convertible bonds are used as back door equity financing in China's market.These findings are in line with motives proposed by Stein (1992).We do not find evidence for theories based on agency cost.; 国家自然科学基金项目“基于市场微观结构理论的三大财务问题的拓展研究”(批准号70772095);“教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划:霍英东教育基金会第十一届高等院校青年教师基金资助项目(批准号111090) |
| 语种 | zh_CN |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 源URL | [http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/102485]  |
| 专题 | 管理学院－已发表论文 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 屈文洲,林振兴. 中国上市公司可转债发行动因:“后门权益”VS“代理成本”, The Motive of Issuing Convertible Bonds in China's Stock Market:"Back Door Equity" VS "Agency Cost"[J],2009. |
| APA | 屈文洲,&林振兴.(2009).中国上市公司可转债发行动因:“后门权益”VS“代理成本”.. |
| MLA | 屈文洲,et al."中国上市公司可转债发行动因:“后门权益”VS“代理成本”".(2009). |
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