大股东控制下的资本投资与利益攫取研究; A Study on Capital Investment and Benefits of Control with a Controlling Shareholder | |
郝颖 ; 刘星 ; 林朝南 | |
2009 | |
关键词 | 大股东控制 资本投资 控制权收益 公司价值 Controlling Shareholders Capital Investment Benefits of Control Corporation Value |
英文摘要 | 基于资本投资形成控制权收益的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司大股东攫取控制权收益的自利动机和市场风险分析,本文以2001-2005年沪深两市A股市场发生了非流通股交易的公司作为考察对象,从固定资产投资和股权投资两个方面对大股东的控制权收益攫取进行了实证研究,并进行了稳健性检验。研究发现,大股东不仅通过资本投资形成了控制权收益,而且资本投资规模越高,增加等量资本投资所攫取的控制权收益越低;尽管通过股权投资攫取控制权收益的隐秘性较高、成本较低,但由于增加了控制链的代理层级,控制性股东的收益占有程度也较低;大股东的自利性资本投资行为不仅挤占了中小投资者的共享利益,而且形成了从增加资本投资、形成更高控制权收益到损害企业价值的传导机制。根据经验结论,本文提出了相应的政策建议。; Private benefits of control arise when cash flow rights do not coincide with control rights,a situation that occurs even in"one-share-one-vote"structures.Corporate decision makers' pursuit of private benefits of control reflects their selfishness and is an important reason for agency conflicts.Controlling shareholders are frequently accused of overinvestment in assets as a consequence of the private benefits they derive from controlling assets.Based on the above derivation of earning control benefits through capital investment,and combining owner equity structure and control rights allocation in Chinese listed companies,we study the behavior of controlling shareholders in obtaining benefits of control from two aspects;fixed capital investment and equity investment.The results indicate that:(1) controlling shareholders can obtain the benefits of control through capital investment, and the scale of capital investment is significantly and positively related to the level of benefit;(2) when capital control is increased, the higher the scale of capital investment,the fewer the benefits of control obtained;(3) compared to fixed capital investment,the cost of obtaining benefits of control through equity investment is lower, but the degree of benefit that controlling shareholders earn from merged corporations is lower;and(4) controlling shareholders' capital investment motivated by their self-interest can harm minority investors and damage corporation value.This research improves the current understanding of private benefits of control in Chinese listed companies,and gives a new perspective for understanding the relationship between private benefits of control and capital investment.The conclusions of this paper also have some policy implications,including improving the market mechanism of control rights,strengthening the reporting of equity investment, and introducing the hearing of witnesses by small shareholders.; 国家自然科学基金项目(70772100、70802067);国家社科基金项目(08JY154);教育部博士点基金(教技发中心函[2006]226号);重庆大学青年骨干教师创新能力培育基金重点项目;人才引进基金的资助 |
语种 | zh_CN |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/102303] ![]() |
专题 | 管理学院-已发表论文 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 郝颖,刘星,林朝南. 大股东控制下的资本投资与利益攫取研究, A Study on Capital Investment and Benefits of Control with a Controlling Shareholder[J],2009. |
APA | 郝颖,刘星,&林朝南.(2009).大股东控制下的资本投资与利益攫取研究.. |
MLA | 郝颖,et al."大股东控制下的资本投资与利益攫取研究".(2009). |
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