Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China

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	Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China
	Tu, Guoqian ; Lin, Bingxuan ; Liu, Feng ; Liu F(刘峰)
刊名	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.002
	2013
关键词	OPERATING PERFORMANCE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FIRMS OWNERSHIP FINANCE LAW CORRUPTION EARNINGS MARKET
英文摘要	We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
语种	英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/87671]
专题	管理学院－已发表论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Tu, Guoqian,Lin, Bingxuan,Liu, Feng,et al. Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China[J]. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.002,2013.
APA	Tu, Guoqian,Lin, Bingxuan,Liu, Feng,&刘峰.(2013).Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.002.
MLA	Tu, Guoqian,et al."Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China".http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2012.10.002 (2013).