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	Capacity Manipulation and Menus of Two Part Tariff Contract in Supply Chain
	Ji, GJ ; Yang, GY ; Chen, J ; Miao, ZW ; Wu, LF ; Ji GJ(计国君)
	2009
关键词	INFORMATION
英文摘要	In a decentralized supply chain, raw material supply uncertainty, phantom orders of downstream firm as well as huge investment sunk costs leads to supplier's production capacity manipulation behavior. A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer who faces a newsvendor problem is considered. The impact of supplier's production capacity manipulation on retailer's purchase decision is discussed. The retailer can adopt a menu of two part tariff contract regarding the terms of trade and capacity. Both supplier and retailer have prior belief about counterpart decision behavior. Then, we construct menus of two part tariff contract offered by the retailer to the supplier who has production capacity manipulation and type dependent reservation profits. Our results show that when capacity difference between type H supplier and type L supplier is higher than a critical threshold, the retailer offers two kinds of optimal menus of two part tariff contract in view of reservation profits difference between the type H supplier and type L supplier, and that both supplier and retailer's prior belief about counterpart decision behavior affect optimal menus of two part tariff contract. Finally, a case study shows our conclusions.
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/60019]
专题	管理学院－已发表论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Ji, GJ,Yang, GY,Chen, J,et al. Capacity Manipulation and Menus of Two Part Tariff Contract in Supply Chain[J],2009.
APA	Ji, GJ,Yang, GY,Chen, J,Miao, ZW,Wu, LF,&计国君.(2009).Capacity Manipulation and Menus of Two Part Tariff Contract in Supply Chain..
MLA	Ji, GJ,et al."Capacity Manipulation and Menus of Two Part Tariff Contract in Supply Chain".(2009).

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