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	Double-edged Incentive Competition for Foreign Direct Investment
	Jie Ma
	2012-04-24 ; 2012-04-24
关键词	Foreign direct investment (Multinational) Incentive competition Special interest lobbying Common agency
中文摘要	This paper studies the impact of special interest lobbying on competition between two countries for a multinational in a common agency framework. We address the following questions. On the positive side, is special interest lobbying a determinant of competition for FDI? If so, how does it work? How does it affect the equilibrium price for attracting FDI? On the normative side, what are the welfare effects of FDI competition when special interest lobbying is present? Is allocative efficiency always achieved? We argue that special interest lobbying provides an extra political incentive for a government to attract FDI. We show that compared to the benchmark case when governments maximize national welfare, now (1) an economically disadvantageous country has a chance to win the competition; (2) the equilibrium price for attracting FDI is higher than in the benchmark case; (3) allocative efficiency cannot be always achieved.
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.calis.edu.cn/hdl/211010/3911]
专题	北京大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jie Ma. Double-edged Incentive Competition for Foreign Direct Investment[J],2012, 2012.
APA	Jie Ma.(2012).Double-edged Incentive Competition for Foreign Direct Investment..
MLA	Jie Ma."Double-edged Incentive Competition for Foreign Direct Investment".(2012).

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