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	IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OUTCOMES IN LIQUIDATING CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS
	Shanwen Gao ; Yang Yao
	2012-04-24 ; 2012-04-24
关键词	Socialist enterprises implementation theory information asymmetry
中文摘要	In this paper, we study an optimal cost sharing scheme between the central and local governments in current China’s process of dissolving public firms through mergers and bankruptcies. We first define the social choice rule that minimizes social costs, then design a mechanism that both implements this rule truthfully under imperfect information and minimizes the central government’s payment. Collusion between the local government and local firms as well as competition among local firms are explored. Our findings show that writing off the bad loans and hardening the budget constraint are two necessary conditions to provide right incentives for truthful revelation. This result is consistent with the predictions of other theories and some recent proposals of revitalizing the banking system and the state sector in China.
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.calis.edu.cn/hdl/211010/3558]
专题	北京大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Shanwen Gao,Yang Yao. IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OUTCOMES IN LIQUIDATING CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS[J],2012, 2012.
APA	Shanwen Gao,&Yang Yao.(2012).IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OUTCOMES IN LIQUIDATING CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS..
MLA	Shanwen Gao,et al."IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIALLY OPTIMAL OUTCOMES IN LIQUIDATING CHINESE PUBLIC FIRMS".(2012).

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