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	Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq
	Yunsen Chen ; Yutao Wang ; Le Lin ; Yunsen Chen ; Yutao Wang ; Le Lin
	2016-03-30 ; 2016-03-30
关键词	Network Independent director Tunneling Socialnetwork analysis F276.6
其他题名	Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq
中文摘要	As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.�2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.; As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.�2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.
语种	英语 ; 英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://ir.lib.tsinghua.edu.cn/ir/item.do?handle=123456789/145626]
专题	清华大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yunsen Chen,Yutao Wang,Le Lin,et al. Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq[J],2016, 2016.
APA	Yunsen Chen,Yutao Wang,Le Lin,Yunsen Chen,Yutao Wang,&Le Lin.(2016).Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq..
MLA	Yunsen Chen,et al."Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq".(2016).

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