CORC  > 清华大学
封闭式基金经理的竞争压力
姚正春 ; 邓淑芳 ; 李志文 ; Yao ZhengChun ; Deng Shufang ; Li Zhiwen
2010-07-19 ; 2010-07-19
关键词封闭式基金 业绩排名 经理任免 业绩持续性 closed-end fund, performance ranking, fund manager tenure, and performance persistence. F832.51 F224
其他题名The Competitive Pressure on the Managers of Close-end Fund
中文摘要在中国,基金经理人员任免频繁,一般认为是由于竞争激烈。为了验证这个说法,本文以任免来度量基金经理的竞争压力,而以基金业绩排名来度量基金经理的竞争能力,然后分析基金经理竞争压力与其业绩考核的关系。我们的研究发现,在封闭式基金中,基金管理公司并没有以业绩作为选用经理的标准,那些任职时间长的经理人员的业绩不比任职时间短的业绩优良。本文同时发现各基金的业绩不具有持续性,每期各基金的业绩是否超越同行平均水平的概率与前期业绩无关,都是0.5。这一发现加强了基金经理的任免与业绩无关的推测。; The tenure of fund managers in China is noticeably short. The common explanation for this phenomenon is the high competitive pressure in this profession. This paper uses the job tenure to measure the fund manger's job pressure and the industry ranking to measure the manager performance. This paper analyzes the relationship between the fund manger's competitive pressure and their performance. Our study shows that the tenure is not associated with performance ranking. Fund mangers with longer tenure do not outperform those with shorter ones. We also find no performance persistence within fund management industry. The probability of a closed - end fund outperforming the market average in any given period is independent of its performance in the previous period. These evidences jointly indicate that the fund manager tenure is independent of performance. Their competitive pressure, if any, does not come from the business performance.
语种中文 ; 中文
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/74892]  
专题清华大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
姚正春,邓淑芳,李志文,等. 封闭式基金经理的竞争压力[J],2010, 2010.
APA 姚正春,邓淑芳,李志文,Yao ZhengChun,Deng Shufang,&Li Zhiwen.(2010).封闭式基金经理的竞争压力..
MLA 姚正春,et al."封闭式基金经理的竞争压力".(2010).
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