| 无政府状态下小国的长期存在 | |
| 周方银 ; Zhou Fangyin | |
| 2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07 | |
| 关键词 | 小国 成本收益 主权规范 博弈 均衡 D81 |
| 其他题名 | The Persistence of Small States under Anarchy |
| 中文摘要 | 国际社会是一个无政府社会,在无政府状态下,国家理论上能够做其物质条件允许它们做的任何事情。由此产生了一个问题:在以无政府状态作为排序原则的国际体系中,小国为什么能够长期存在? 本文在辨析已有的成本收益解释和主权规范解释这两种思路的不足的基础上,提出博弈视角的解释,把它作为对成本收益解释和主权规范解释的补充。在此基础上进行理论推论,认为在博弈视角下,国家的边界从总体上更为稳定,大国之间的平衡状态为小国提供了更大的生存空间以及小国可以在大国的博弈中起到信号作用等等。本文所做的案例分析也显示出博弈视角的合理性和价值。; The world community is an anarchic society. Under anarchy, states can do any thing they are physically capable of doing. Hence, the following question emerges: How can small states persist in an international system that is ordered on the principle of anarchy? After an analysis of the two existing approaches--the cost-benefit explanation and the sove-reignty norms explanation - the author uses the game theory perspective to supplement to these two explanations. The author then makes some theoretical deductions. For example, under the game theory perspective, international boundaries are more stable, equilibrium among big states provides more living space for small states, and small states can act as signals in the games of the big states. The opinions in this article are supported by some case study evidence. |
| 语种 | 中文 ; 中文 |
| 内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
| 源URL | [http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/43275]  |
| 专题 | 清华大学 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 周方银,Zhou Fangyin. 无政府状态下小国的长期存在[J],2010, 2010. |
| APA | 周方银,&Zhou Fangyin.(2010).无政府状态下小国的长期存在.. |
| MLA | 周方银,et al."无政府状态下小国的长期存在".(2010). |
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