CORC  > 清华大学
不甘落后劳动者模型
武永胜 ; 刘玲玲 ; WU Yong sheng ; LIU Ling ling
2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07
关键词不对称信息 委托代理 不甘落后系数 principle-agent model the model of acquiring achievementsense the utility function of acquiring achievement-sense F224
其他题名Non-Lagged Worker: A Model of Economic Explain about a Wage Compact
中文摘要文章开始介绍了实际中观察到的两份工资合同:A 合同低底薪,然后按比例提成;B 合同高底薪,但要求达到一定的产出额度,超出按比例提成,不足按相同比例扣减。由于简单的参数模型不足以解释这两份合同的差别,作者运用委托代理的思想设计了不甘落后的劳动者模型,此模型的假设是,不甘落后的劳动者,依据薪酬周期的前半部分的努力水平,调整在后半部分中的努力水平。在这里作者引入了不甘落后系数,这样模型很好地解释了上述两份合同的差别。并且得出随着不甘落后系数的增大,代理人分享产出的比例逐步减小,总代理成本逐步减小。此模型随后还得出最优合同设置的必要条件。; This paper begins with two pieces of wage compact. One is low base pay with a percentage deduction from the sum of total optput,while the other is high base pay, but a ration of the work should be finished. If he exceeds the ration, he deducts a percentage from the excess. If he falls short of the ration, he loses the same percentage from the deficiency. Because the simple HM model(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) is deficient in explaining the differences between these two compacts, I build MAAS (the model of acquiring achievementsense) by using principleagent model, which well explains the differences between these two compacts, And I induce that the share proportion of deputy in output and the total cost of agent will decrease as AAS (acquiring achievementsense) coefficient increase. At the same time, the utility function of acquiring achievementsense is a multiple criterion utility function, which indicates that not only income is important to labor, but also fulfilling his achievement motivation.
语种中文 ; 中文
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/40317]  
专题清华大学
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
武永胜,刘玲玲,WU Yong sheng,等. 不甘落后劳动者模型[J],2010, 2010.
APA 武永胜,刘玲玲,WU Yong sheng,&LIU Ling ling.(2010).不甘落后劳动者模型..
MLA 武永胜,et al."不甘落后劳动者模型".(2010).
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