不甘落后劳动者模型 | |
武永胜 ; 刘玲玲 ; WU Yong sheng ; LIU Ling ling | |
2010-06-07 ; 2010-06-07 | |
关键词 | 不对称信息 委托代理 不甘落后系数 principle-agent model the model of acquiring achievementsense the utility function of acquiring achievement-sense F224 |
其他题名 | Non-Lagged Worker: A Model of Economic Explain about a Wage Compact |
中文摘要 | 文章开始介绍了实际中观察到的两份工资合同:A 合同低底薪,然后按比例提成;B 合同高底薪,但要求达到一定的产出额度,超出按比例提成,不足按相同比例扣减。由于简单的参数模型不足以解释这两份合同的差别,作者运用委托代理的思想设计了不甘落后的劳动者模型,此模型的假设是,不甘落后的劳动者,依据薪酬周期的前半部分的努力水平,调整在后半部分中的努力水平。在这里作者引入了不甘落后系数,这样模型很好地解释了上述两份合同的差别。并且得出随着不甘落后系数的增大,代理人分享产出的比例逐步减小,总代理成本逐步减小。此模型随后还得出最优合同设置的必要条件。; This paper begins with two pieces of wage compact. One is low base pay with a percentage deduction from the sum of total optput,while the other is high base pay, but a ration of the work should be finished. If he exceeds the ration, he deducts a percentage from the excess. If he falls short of the ration, he loses the same percentage from the deficiency. Because the simple HM model(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) is deficient in explaining the differences between these two compacts, I build MAAS (the model of acquiring achievementsense) by using principleagent model, which well explains the differences between these two compacts, And I induce that the share proportion of deputy in output and the total cost of agent will decrease as AAS (acquiring achievementsense) coefficient increase. At the same time, the utility function of acquiring achievementsense is a multiple criterion utility function, which indicates that not only income is important to labor, but also fulfilling his achievement motivation. |
语种 | 中文 ; 中文 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
源URL | [http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/40317] ![]() |
专题 | 清华大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 武永胜,刘玲玲,WU Yong sheng,等. 不甘落后劳动者模型[J],2010, 2010. |
APA | 武永胜,刘玲玲,WU Yong sheng,&LIU Ling ling.(2010).不甘落后劳动者模型.. |
MLA | 武永胜,et al."不甘落后劳动者模型".(2010). |
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