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A note on "cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-iretailer supply chains"
Xie, JX ; Ai, S
2010-05-06 ; 2010-05-06 ; OCT
关键词cooperative advertising supply chains leader-follower relationship Pareto efficiencies Management Operations Research & Management Science
中文摘要This note extends the results in the manufacturer-dominated game model of the paper by Li et al. (Omega 30 (2002) 347) to the case where the manufacturer's marginal profit is not large enough. In such situations, the profit of the entire supply chain under the co-op advertising mode is higher than the one under the Stackelberg game, which is consistent with the results of the original paper. However, the advertising expenditures of the manufacturer and the retailer under the co-op advertising model are not always larger than those under the Stackelberg game, which is different from the results of the original paper. Furthermore, the results are also compared with the simultaneous move game of the paper by Huang and Li (Eur. J. Oper. Res. 135 (2001) 527). The manufacturer always prefers the leader-follower structure rather than the simultaneous move structure, which is consistent with the results of the original paper. However, the retailer always prefers the simultaneous move structure rather than the leader-follower structure, which differs from the results of the original paper. (c) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All fights reserved.
语种英语 ; 英语
出版者PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD ; OXFORD ; THE BOULEVARD, LANGFORD LANE, KIDLINGTON, OXFORD OX5 1GB, ENGLAND
内容类型期刊论文
源URL[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/13815]  
专题清华大学
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GB/T 7714
Xie, JX,Ai, S. A note on "cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-iretailer supply chains"[J],2010, 2010, OCT.
APA Xie, JX,&Ai, S.(2010).A note on "cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-iretailer supply chains"..
MLA Xie, JX,et al."A note on "cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer-iretailer supply chains"".(2010).
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