Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma

	Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma
	He JZ 1,2; Wang RW[]2; Li YT[]3
刊名	PLOS ONE
	2014
卷号	9 期号:8 页码:e103931
通讯作者	wangrw@mail.kiz.ac.cn ; liyaotang@ynu.edu.cn
合作状况	其它
英文摘要	It is often assumed that in public goods games, contributors are either strong or weak players and each individual has an equal probability of exhibiting cooperation. It is difficult to explain why the public good is produced by strong individuals in some cooperation systems, and by weak individuals in others. Viewing the asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game as an evolutionary game, we find that whether the strong or the weak players produce the public good depends on the initial condition (i.e., phenotype or initial strategy of individuals). These different evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) associated with different initial conditions, can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods of different cooperation systems. A further analysis revealed that the strong player adopts a pure strategy but mixed strategies for the weak players to produce the public good, and that the probability of volunteering by weak players decreases with increasing group size or decreasing cost-benefit ratio. Our model shows that the defection probability of a "strong'' player is greater than the "weak'' players in the model of Diekmann (1993). This contradicts Selten's (1980) model that public goods can only be produced by a strong player, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy, and will therefore disappear over evolutionary time. Our public good model with ESS has thus extended previous interpretations that the public good can only be produced by strong players in an asymmetric game.
收录类别	SCI
资助信息	This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (31270433, 31170408, 71161020), the Yunnan Natural Science Foundation (2013FD030), National Science Fund for Distinguished Young Scholars (31325005), NSFC- Yunnan United fund (U1302267), the Program for Innovative Research Team (in Science and Technology) in University of Yunnan Province, the West Light Foundation of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Special Fund for the Excellent Youth of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (KSCX2-EW-Q-9), Scientific Research Foundation for Introduction of Talent of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics (YC2013D05), Special Fund for Chair Professor Lei Shi, Special Fund for Provincial Key Disciplines–Statistics.
语种	英语
WOS记录号	WOS:000341105100022
公开日期	2014-08-29
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://159.226.149.42:8088/handle/152453/7991]
专题	昆明动物研究所_实验与理论生态学昆明动物研究所_遗传资源与进化国家重点实验室
作者单位	1.Statistics and Mathematics College, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan, China 2.State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, Yunnan, China 3.School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming, Yunnan, China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	He JZ,Wang RW[],Li YT[]. Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma[J]. PLOS ONE,2014,9(8):e103931.
APA	He JZ,Wang RW[],&Li YT[].(2014).Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma.PLOS ONE,9(8),e103931.
MLA	He JZ,et al."Evolutionary Stability in the Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma".PLOS ONE 9.8(2014):e103931.