Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism

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	Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism
	Weyl EG 1; Frederickson ME 1,2; Yu DW[*]3,4; Pierce NE 1,5
刊名	PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
	2010
卷号	107 期号:36 页码:15712-15716
关键词	evolution of cooperation punishment symbiosis partner fidelity feedback host sanctions
通讯作者	dougwyu@gmail.com
合作状况	其它
英文摘要	Although mutualisms are common in all ecological communities and have played key roles in the diversification of life, our current understanding of the evolution of cooperation applies mostly to social behavior within a species. A central question is whether mutualisms persist because hosts have evolved costly punishment of cheaters. Here, we use the economic theory of employment contracts to formulate and distinguish between two mechanisms that have been proposed to prevent cheating in host-symbiont mutualisms, partner fidelity feedback (PFF) and host sanctions (HS). Under PFF, positive feedback between host fitness and symbiont fitness is sufficient to prevent cheating; in contrast, HS posits the necessity of costly punishment to maintain mutualism. A coevolutionary model of mutualism finds that HS are unlikely to evolve de novo, and published data on legume-rhizobia and yucca-moth mutualisms are consistent with PFF and not with HS. Thus, in systems considered to be textbook cases of HS, we find poor support for the theory that hosts have evolved to punish cheating symbionts; instead, we show that even horizontally transmitted mutualisms can be stabilized via PFF. PFF theory may place previously underappreciated constraints on the evolution of mutualism and explain why punishment is far from ubiquitous in nature.
收录类别	SCI
资助信息	This research was supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES- 0750480) and the European Science Foundation/European Collaborative Re- search (ESF/EUROCORES) programme’s support for the The Evolution of Co- operation and Trading (TECT) project. D.W.Y. thanks the Yunnan provincial government (20080A001) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (0902281081) for additionalfunding, and M.E.F.thanksthe Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. E.G.W. and M.E.F. were supported by the Harvard Society of Fellows.
语种	英语
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://159.226.149.26:8080/handle/152453/10446]
专题	昆明动物研究所_动物生态学研究中心昆明动物研究所_遗传资源与进化国家重点实验室
作者单位	1.Society of Fellows, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 2.Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada M5S 3G5 3.State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Ecology, Conservation, and Environment Center, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Kunming, Yunnan 650223, China 4.School of Biological Sciences, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk NR47TJ, United Kingdom 5.Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Weyl EG,Frederickson ME,Yu DW[*],et al. Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,2010,107(36):15712-15716.
APA	Weyl EG,Frederickson ME,Yu DW[*],&Pierce NE.(2010).Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism.PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,107(36),15712-15716.
MLA	Weyl EG,et al."Economic contract theory tests models of mutualism".PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 107.36(2010):15712-15716.